GO cancelling co-op societies polls quashed http://www.expressbuzz.com/edition/story.aspx?artid=P9z2jrQY3A0=&Title=GO+cancelling+co-op+societies+polls+quashed&SectionID=vBlkz7JCFvA=&MainSectionID=fyV9T2jIa4A=&SectionName=EL7znOtxBM3qzgMyXZKtxw==&SEO=
CHENNAI: The Madras High Court has set aside a GO dated July 11, 2007 of the Co-operation, Food and Consumer Department, which cancelled the elections held or were in progress to all the co-operative societies in the State, in respect of two writ appeals.
The GO cancelled the elections to primary, central and apex co-operative societies in the State, commencing on June 8, 2007, under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act.
Dr P Rajaji and D Kulasekaran moved the court with writ petitions challenging the GO and a consequential order of the Registrar of Societies cancelling their election to the Madras Advocates Co-operative Society Limited. And a single judge dismissed their petitions on June 3, 2008. Hence, the writ appeals.
KANCHI SP DIRECTED TO APPEAR: The Madras High Court has directed the Superintendent of Police, Kanchipuram district, to appear before it on October 28, in connection with a contempt of court application involving Fisheries Minister K P P Samy, on Monday.
CONSULT BAR BEFORE APPOINTING JUDGES: The Madras High Court Advocates Association has appealed to the Chief Justice to consult the Bar Associations before selecting persons to the post of High Court judges. A resolution to this effect was adopted at the general body meeting of the association, chaired by its president R C Paul Kanakaraj, last week.
ASSISTANT DIRECTORS RE-POSTED: As many as 18 assistant directors of Horticulture,who were reverted as Horticultural officers due to want of vacancies, were given re-postings as assistant directors in the Horticultural departments in various districts. Originally, S Mudiyandi and 17 others filed a writ petition challenging the reversion orders issued on July 18, 2008.
VACATION JUDGES NAMED: Justice T Sudanthiram and Justice K Kannan will be the vacation judges during the Pooja holidays. They will sit on Oct 7 and take up urgent matters. Cases can be filed on October 6.
They will first constitute a division bench to dispose of urgent bench matters and then they will sit single.
Express News Service
30 Sep 2008 03:38:00 AM IST
www.expressbuzz.com
Despite HC stay, Govt set to run Bhamashah scheme
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Jaipur/Despite_HC_stay_Govt_set_to_run_Bhamashah_scheme/articleshow/3542818.cms
JAIPUR: The state government on Monday announced that it would not stop distributing the smart cards under the Bhamashah Naari Shashaktikaran Scheme as the Rajasthan High Court had only stayed the implementation of the notice issued on July 7, 2008, which had directions about awarding cash prizes for a good job done by gram sevak patwaris and others. Addressing a press conference after a cabinet meeting on Monday, state cabinet minister Ghanshyam Tiwari said, “The scheme will continue. There is no ban on the implementation of the scheme or distributing smart cards.’’ Tiwari alleged that the PIL which led to the high court staying the notice was a foul play of the Congress. “The Congress has failed to counter our development agenda for the forthcoming assembly elections and hence, is now using such tactics,’’ he alleged, adding the person who had filed the PIL is known for filing several of them, most of which had been rejected. Tiwari added that the Congress — within the state and at the Centre — has been acting in a biased manner. Citing the example of the NREGS, he claimed that despite the fact that the state ranked first for three consecutive years for its implementation, the Centre was deliberately not releasing funds. “It has released funds for districts like Sawai Madhopur and Jhunjhunu, which are Congress strongholds but not other districts. Is that not a biased decision,’’ he added. The cabinet on Monday also decided to re-send the New University Ordinance to the governor S K Singh, which he had recently sent back to the government. The government had passed the ordinance to open three new universities at Alwar, Sikar and Bharatpur. “We had approached the advocate general and there is nothing wrong with it. The Congress, when it was even power, had opened the Kota University under the same act,’’ he said, adding that he hoped that the governor clears it soon for the benefit of the residents of these districts. The cabinet on Monday also passed the proposal of forming the mineral development company of Rajasthan, the office-bearers of which would be of the rank of departmental secretaries. It also cleared the Guaranteed Land Title Bill.
30 Sep 2008, 0608 hrs IST,TNN
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com
Did Ramadoss flout dental council norms?
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/Did_Ramadoss_flout_dental_council_norms/articleshow/3542633.cms
NEW DELHI: In its hurry to grant permission to dental colleges to conduct post-graduate courses in surgery, has Union health ministry under Anbumani Ramadoss cleared applications — of as many as 18 institutions — either bypassing or disregarding the views of the Dental Council of India? A PIL in the Delhi high court alleged that through this open defiance of norms and procedures, which have been earlier upheld by Supreme Court, the ministry set up its own "central inspection teams" (CITs) which were dispatched to colleges to carry out assessments and on the basis of their reports, MDS courses were sanctioned. The ministry has set up CITs under Section 10A(4) of the Dentists (Amendment) Act, 1993, under which the Centre can obtain "requisite" documents from applicant institutions but does not empower it to set aside or ignore the role of the DCI which is mandated to carry out inspections, the PIL said. The use of CITs was contrary to law. The PIL, taken up last week by the HC, said the clause does not allow the ministry to conduct non-statutory inspections nor give the Centre power to set up a CIT to ascertain infrastructural facilities in a college. The entire set of permissions are now under scanner as the PIL alleges that both the time schedule for admissions as well as the DCI's central role has been brazenly flouted by the ministry. "Central government has conducted inspections of dental colleges not recommended by DCI for PG courses for academic year 2008-09," the PIL has stated. The HC has issued notices to the health ministry and DCI to respond in four weeks. The apparent ruse of using the "CIT route" to grant permission for courses seems to be a favourite device of the ministry. Last Friday, the ministry granted permission to an Indore college to admit 150 medical students on the very day the institution's plea was dismissed by the SC on the basis of Medical Council of India reports which were endorsed by the Centre's senior law officer Gopal Subramaniam. The PIL has said that during the academic year 2008-09, 27 letters of intent (LOI) had DCI recommendations and 18 had CIT endorsements. Of the 18 LOIs, in six cases, the recommendation of both DCI and CIT were available, said petitioners Indian Dental Association and Dr Sabu Kurien, who is a member of the association. They have pointed to the ministry having "conducted inspections of dental colleges not inspected at all by the DCI". The Supreme Court has held that though the Centre is the final authority in granting permission to medical and dental colleges, it could do so only with a recommendation to that effect from the Medical Council of India (MCI) and the DCI. The colleges which have been named in the petition and which are party to the case include colleges based in areas like Tirupati, Vishakapatnam, West Godavari, Mangalore, Gulbarga, Bangalore, Yelahanka, Hassan, Pune, Chennai, Lucknow, Mathura and Bareilly. The petition alleged that the ministry has submitted that the last date for completion of admission procedure is May 31, 2008, as per schedule framed in pursuance of SC judgment and LOP have been issued before this date. But the schedule of admission, as laid down by SC, is May 2 and according to DCI regulations, the LOP can be issued only up to March 31. The distortion in the ministry response is aimed at justifying "illegal and improper issue of LOP to respondent colleges", the petition averred. The modification of the March 31 deadline can only be done in exceptional circumstances and by recording reasons in writing but not in the reckless manner adopted by the ministry.
30 Sep 2008, 0449 hrs IST, Rajeev Deshpande & Dhananjay Mahapatra,TNN
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com
Custodial violence: SC seeks response from States http://www.zeenews.com/articles.asp?aid=472813&sid=NAT
New Delhi, Sept 29: The Supreme Court on Monday sought response from state governments on steps being taken by them to prevent custodial violence, which a PIL alleged was on the rise. A three-judge bench of Chief Justice K G Balakrishnan, Justices P Sathasivam and J M Panchal, sought the response within eight weeks, after senior counsel and amicus curiae (friend of court) Abhishek Manu Singhvi, complained that the earlier directions framed by the apex court to prevent custodial violence were not being followed by the States. The amicus curiae submitted that in 1997, the apex court in the D K Basu vs State of West Bengal had strictly prohibited the use of third degree methods on suspects and framed various guidelines for protecting their human rights. It had also passed periodical directions asking the States and the State Human Rights Commissions (SHRC) to ensure compliance of its directions and had further requested the chairpersons of SHRCs to constitute sub-committees to oversee the compliance of the directions. But despite such directions, the States and the SHRC have not been forthcoming with compliance reports, Singhvi stated. He submitted that custodial rapes, deaths and torture continue to occur in various parts of the country. Quoting a report of the National Human Research Bureau, he said there were 78 custodial deaths in the country during 2005. Magisterial inquiries were ordered only in 15 of the cases while in one incident a judicial inquiry was ordered. Though 48 cases were registered against erring policemen officials, not a single policeman was chargesheeted or convicted for custodial deaths, he added. Bureau Report
www.zeenews.com
Hari Masjid case: Why is CBI running away, asks High Court
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/Hari-Masjid-case--Why-is-CBI-running-away--asks-High-Court/367641
The Bombay High Court on Monday asked the Centre why the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) is reluctant in investigating the Hari Masjid police firing case in which seven people had died 15 years back. "Why is the agency running away from the case? You rush to investigate other cases. Here seven persons died but you are aloof," a Division Bench of Justice F I Rebello and Justice Ashutosh Kumbhakoni said.
The case pertains to the death of seven persons in police firing outside the mosque during the 1992-93 riots. Farooq Mapkar who was chargesheeted for murder and rioting in 1992-93 had urged the court to initiate action against the then assistant police inspector Nikhil Kapse, who was held "guilty of unjustified firing" and "inhuman and brutal behaviour" in the Srikrishna Commission report.
Mapkar had moved the High Court seeking a CBI inquiry. Although the Maharashtra Government is ready to hand over the case, the CBI is not willing to take it up. The state government issued a notification last year, handing over the case to CBI. But the agency told the High Court that its hands were full and it cannot investigate a 15-year-old case in which a Special Task Force had already given the police a clean chit.
Although the Commission report had indicted Kapse's team for opening fire without any provocation, a departmental inquiry found that the police were not at fault. The police had filed a case of rioting against Mapkar. The court today said it would examine whether the CBI can refuse to take over a case despite a request from the state government and adjourned the hearing to October 7.
Posted: Sep 30, 2008 at 0301 hrs IST
www.indianexpress.com
Consumers should avoid filing frivolous cases in court: CJI
http://www.zeenews.com/articles.asp?aid=473135&sid=NAT
New Delhi, Sept 30: Though consumer is king, they should avoid filing frivolous cases in consumer courts, the Chief Justice KG Balakrishnan said on Tuesday. Justice Balakrishnan said that people, knowingly and unknowingly, enter into several service contracts. "Even travelling in a DTC bus passengers enter into a contract," he said. The CJI said that most of the people are unaware about the implication of laws, hence, suffer problems. Like big industrial houses, small traders also enter into contract with the consumers, but they should not be made to pay compensation which they cannot afford, he suggested. He claimed if a small trader earning Rs 1000 is made to pay a compensation of Rs 20 thousand then he will have to wind up his business. "Therefore, though a king, consumer should avoid filing frivolous cases before the consumer forums," the justice said addressing a gathering to mark the launch of a book 'Consumer is King' National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission member Rajyalakshmi Rao. Bureau Report
www.zeenews.com
Cash at judge`s door: Officers of HP govt questioned http://www.zeenews.com/articles.asp?aid=473102&sid=REG
Chandigarh, Sept 30: The three-member judge panel set up to probe the cash at judge's door scandal on Tuesday questioned some officers of the Himachal Pradesh Government and a few others. The panel, which continued its examination at the Union territory Guest house here, questioned at length as many as three officers from the Revenue and other departments of Himachal Pradesh in a "closed chamber", sources said. Police had last month registered a case under the Prevention of Corruption Act after Rs 15 lakh was "mistakenly" delivered at the residence of Justice Nirmaljit Kaur by a Munshi (clerk) of the then Haryana Advocate General Sanjiv Bansal allegedly on behalf of a Delhi businessman Ravinder Singh. A land deal at Solan is also under the scanner of the panel set up by Chief Justice of India K G Balakrishnan. An elderly couple, believed to be the land owners, too was examined by the panel comprising Allahabad High Court Chief Justice Hemant Laxman Gokhale, Gujarat High Court Chief Justice K S Radhakrishnan and Justice Madan B Lokur of the Delhi High Court. The Himachal Pradesh Government had reportedly granted permission to 18 persons, including Justice Nirmal Yadav of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, to buy land at Rihun village near Solan, the sources said. Bureau Report
www.zeenews.com
FIR must? SC doubts validity of order
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/FIR_must_SC_doubts_validity_of_order/articleshow/3542640.cms
NEW DELHI: A three-judge Supreme Court Bench comprising CJI and Justices P Sathasivam and G S Singhvi on Monday virtually made light of an earlier directive of a two-judge Bench proposing penal action against cops if they refuse to register an FIR immediately on a complaint alleging commission of a serious crime. When earlier contradicting judgments of the apex court on the issue of immediate registration of FIRs was cited before the two-judge Bench, it had referred the vexed issue to a larger Bench while keeping in force its interim order providing for punishment to cops who refuse to lodge FIRs. Finding prima facie lacunae in the two-judge Bench order, the three-judge Bench said if the police was to register any complaint disclosing a cognizable offence, then no citizen of the country would be safe from police cases. "The police must be satisfied about the bona fide of the complaint and its veracity before registering an FIR," the Bench said.
30 Sep 2008, 0453 hrs IST,TNN
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com
Quake relief fund: BJP MLA under High Court scanner
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/Quake-relief-fund--BJP-MLA-under-High-Court-scanner/367410
AHMEDABAD, SEPT 29 A controversy regarding misappropriation of Rs 60.96 lakh by Radhanpur BJP legislator Shankar Chaudhary from the Prime Minister’s relief fund for the 2001 quake victims has reached the Gujarat High Court. Notices have now been sent to the Centre and the National Building Construction Corporation (NBCC) in this regard.
The notices were issued based on a petition by a Radhanpur resident, Farsunbhai Mujibhai Goklam, who charged Chaudhary of misappropriating the funds.
According to the petition, Shri Vivekanand Vikas Mandal, a trust run by the MLA and his family, ran a number of educational institutions, including the Nalanda Girls School in Radhanpur.
The said school was run from a rented building belonging to another trust — the Sarvodaya Arogya Nidhi and did not suffer damage in the earthquake. But Chaudhary “connived with the state Government officials and fabricated evidence to swindle the amount from the relief fund for his personal benefit.”
Syed Khalique Ahmed Posted: Sep 30, 2008 at 2349 hrs IST
www.indianexpress.com
Mumbai High Court Ask Cipla to Reply in 2 Weeks
http://patentcircle.blogspot.com/2008/09/mumbai-high-court-ask-cipla-to-reply-in.html
Mint has further reported that Justice Abhay Oka of Mumbai High Court has asked Cipla to reply in two weeks to the patent infringement suit filed by Swiss-major F Hoffmann-La-Roche over anti-infection drug Valganciclovir. The case is expected to come up for hearing in the third week of October. In parallel, Roche is also facing post-grant oppositions from Ranbaxy, Cipla and the Delhi Network of Positive People in the Chennai Patent Office. Though we are not able to go through the complete specification of Valganciclovir patent but according to reliable sources Roche’s patent has broadly issued claims which may likely invalidated on the grounds of obviousness (and possibly be challengeable under section 3(d) on the grounds of obvious variation of known compound ganciclovir).
By Varun @ 3:00:00 AM
Tuesday, September 30, 2008
http://patentcircle.blogspot.com
Cinema employee gets six months imprisonment under SC/ST Act
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Delhi/Cinema_employee_gets_six_months_imprisonment_under_SCST_Act/articleshow/3542444.cms
NEW DELHI: A former cinema theatre employee, who worked as a ticket booking clerk, on Monday was sentenced to six months of simple imprisonment by a sessions court for using abusive language against his subordinate. Convicting the accused under Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe (SC/ST) Act, ASJ Rajnish Kumar Gupta also imposed a fine of Rs 2,000 on convict Satya Prakash alias Bhatnagar. A resident of Karol Bagh in central Delhi, 69-year-old Satya Prakash was held guilty under Section 3(1)(x) of the Schedule Caste/Schedule Tribe Act (Prevention of Atrocities) Act dealing with insulting or intimidating with the intent to humiliate an SC/ST in public view. The purpose of the Act is to prevent atrocities and help in social inclusion of Dalits into the society. The court relied heavily on the prosecution’s version while holding Satya Prakash guilty. According to the prosecution, Satya Prakash, who worked as booking clerk at Regal Cinema in Connaught Place, had used abusive language against complainant Nanak on August 10, 2003. An FIR was registered at the Connaught Place police station on the victim’s complaint. Following the examination of prosecution witnesses, the court convicted Satya Prakash and awarded him imprisonment and also slapped a fine on him. Earlier, the SC had observed that addressing Scheduled Caste people as ‘ chamar ’ may amount to an offence punishable under the provision of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
30 Sep 2008, 0322 hrs IST,TNN
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com
Custodial deaths up by 81%, SC seeks Centre's reply
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/Custodial_deaths_up_by_81_SC_seeks_Centres_reply/articleshow/3542671.cms
NEW DELHI: In the UPA government's first year in office, the custodial death figure shot up by 81%. Acting on this complaint, the Supreme Court on Monday issued notices to the Centre and all state governments asking them to give responses within eight weeks. The dramatic rise was pointed out by amicus curiae, senior advocate A M Singhvi and advocate Suruchii Aggarwal, before a Bench comprising Chief Justice K G Balakrishnan and Justices P Sathasivam and K M Panchal. They alleged that the 10 commandments laid down by SC in 1997 in the famous D K Basu case — to stop harassment of detainees by police and keep the arrested persons in humane conditions — appeared to have been confined to the files and signboards in police stations. Quoting National Crime Records Bureau and its publication 'Crime in India for the Year 2005', the amicus curiae said during the year 2005, there were 67 deaths in police custody.
30 Sep 2008, 0458 hrs IST,TNN
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com
SC reinstates Chahal’s relief
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/SC-reinstates-Chahal-s-relief/367683
Chandigarh, September 29 In a major sigh of reprieve for ex-media advisor B I S Chahal to former Punjab CM Amarinder Singh, the Supreme Court has stayed the operation of the order passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court on September 10.
Through the order, the High Court had recalled the interim relief given to Chahal wherein the Punjab Government had been directed to issue three days notice before arresting Chahal in any fresh case. However, this order was later withdrawn by the High Court. Chahal moved the Supreme Court, which today issued notices to the Punjab govt and reinstated the relief given to Chahal.
Chahal had alleged that he might well yet again be made a victim of political vendetta for his close association with Captain Amarinder Singh.
Express News Service Posted: Sep 30, 2008 at 0350 hrs IST
www.indianexpress.com
State govts, sleuths get SC notice on custody deaths
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/News/PoliticsNation/State_govts_sleuths_get_SC_notice_on_custody_deaths/articleshow/3542423.cms
NEW DELHI: The Supreme Court on Monday sought explanations from state governments on steps taken to protect rights of an accused during custodial interrogation. The court also issued notices to CBI, RAW, Directorate of Enforcement, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, CID, State Armed Police and others. A bench comprising Chief Justice K G Balakrishnan, Justice P Sathasivam and Justice J M Panchal called for a report with regard to the custodial deaths in 2006 and 2007 across states. The order was on a plea which alleged that there has been a sudden rise in custodial deaths across the country. During 2005, there were 78 custodial deaths of persons who were remanded to such custody by courts, said an application filed through advocate Suruchi Aggarwal. It cited a report of the National Human Research Bureau to substantiate its plea. “As per the report, such deaths have increased by 12.1% in 2004 over 2003 (from 33 in 2003 to 37 in 2004) and 81.1% in 2005 over 2004 (from 37 in 2004 to 67 in 2005) at the all-India level. Magisterial inquiry was ordered/conducted only in 15 reported incidents in 2005. Judicial inquiry was ordered only in 1 such incident. Correspondingly, 48 cases were registered against police personnel and no policemen was either charge-sheeted or convicted for custodial deaths,” the application said. “There were 61 incidents of deaths in police custody of persons who were taken in custody by police in 2003, which declined to 49 in 2004 and increased to 61 in 2005. Magisterial inquiry was ordered in 38 incidents of 61 such deaths reported, and judicial inquiry was ordered only in 4 incidents. Cases were registered against police personnel in 33 incidents. 4 policemen were charge-sheeted and 3 police personnel were convicted in 2005,” it said. Relying on the report of National Human Research Bureau, the application said that more number of deaths in police custody took place during hospitalisation/treatment (49), suicides (30) and illness/natural death (28) in year 2005. It said that there has been continuous decline in custodial deaths due to suicides during 2002-04 as 36, 30 and 24 such deaths respectively have been reported during these years. Custodial deaths due to illness/natural deaths have shown a decrease of 12.5% in 2004 over 2003 (from 16 deaths in 2003 to 14 deaths in 2004) which increased to 28 in 2005 (by 100% in 2005 over 2004), report said. It has also drawn attention of the court towards incidents of custodial rapes. Seven cases of custodial rape were reported in 2005. Jharkhand reported highest with 5 such incidents with 1 each coming from Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. Two out of 5 such cases in Jharkhand and one in Tamil Nadu is pending investigation, the application said. It is difficult to prosecute guilty policemen accused of using third-degree methods during custodial interrogation, it said. In the case of prosecution by police in custodial deaths, it is very difficult to find eye witnesses.
30 Sep, 2008, 0304 hrs IST,Sanjay K Singh, ET Bureau
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com
SC to take up speed governor case today
http://www.hindu.com/2008/09/30/stories/2008093050360100.htm
Transport operators stick to their decision to go on strike
BANGALORE: Various transport organisations on Monday reiterated their threat to go ahead with the proposed strike from Tuesday midnight against the speed governor rule. If the Supreme Court upholds the Karnataka High Court order on Tuesday, all the organisations will have their vehicles off the road even as inter-State operators will not enter Karnataka, representatives of these organisations.
Transport Minister R. Ashok appealed to these operators to withdraw their strike and wait for the Supreme Court verdict. He told presspersons here on Monday that the authority to order installation of speed governors was now with the Centre and the State Government was helpless in the matter. The State Government had done its best to convince the Supreme Court on the need for a uniform policy across the country governing speed governors, he added.
No study
It has been nearly three years since all heavy goods vehicles, stage carriages, contract carriages and school buses were fitted with speed governors in Kerala. Neither has there been any study on the impact of this device nor has there been any marked change in the accident rate in that State during these years.
No study has either been conducted by the Union Ministry of Road Transport and Highways.
The Ministry’s website just lists the number of accidents, State-wise statistics and the number of those killed in these accidents, that too as of 2004. No scientific study on the nature of accidents and the causes appears to have been conducted by the Ministry.
However, the statistics show a decline in the number of accidents and the number of deaths per thousand vehicles since 1971 without there being any speed governor rule.
While 814.42 accidents and 103.50 deaths were reported per thousand vehicles in 1971, it came down to 147.56 and 53.09 in 1990, 80.12 and 18.27 in 200 and 59.12 accidents and 12.74 deaths in 2004. The number of vehicles during the period grew from 1,14,100 to 4,29,910 and the number of total deaths increased from 14,500 to 92,618.
Lobby at work?
Transporters’ organisations have been alleging that the lobby of speed governor manufacturers was behind enforcement of this rule. If the rule was enforced across the country, nearly one crore transport vehicles would have to be fitted with these devices and each unit of the device costs not less than Rs. 15,000. Manufacturers of the device stand to mop up not less than Rs. 15,000 crore.
Tuesday, Sep 30, 2008
Anil Kumar Sastry
www.hindu.com
SC without adequate number of judges for 4 months
http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=57191
The Appellate and High Court (HC) divisions of Supreme Court (SC) have been without adequate judges as two judge's posts at Appellate Division have remained vacant since July 2 and no new judge was appointed to the HC in more than four years.Sources said at least seven HC Division judges would retire next year while five Appellate Division judges would retire by 2010 with the chief justice retiring next year.The shortage has resulted in increasing number of cases pending with both the divisions, causing suffering to litigants.At present, the Appellate Division has five judges against seven posts following retirement of two judges.The HC, on the other hand, now has 61 judges. The number had risen to 72 after 19 additional judges were appointed to the HC on August 23, 2004, but 11 of them have since either retired or been promoted to the Appellate Division.Sources said the government is not appointing judges as appeals against HC judgments in two cases regarding recruitment of judges are pending with the apex court. The HC in its judgment directed the government to reappoint 10 HC judges and declared illegal a part of the Supreme Judicial Commission Ordinance 2008 promulgated for appointing judges.The attorney general's office, however, observes that the government could still appoint judges as per the chief justice's recommendations.A deputy attorney general said, "The government earlier appointed judges to the High Court although a case regarding recruitment of judges was pending with the Supreme Court."If new judges are not appointed soon, the crisis with pending cases will be very serious and the government will have to face it," he said, stressing that judges should be immediately appointed to the two divisions for quick disposal of the pending cases.Attorney General (AG) Salauddin Ahmed also said, "The government is the authority to appoint judges to the apex court. It can appoint judges any time." He expressed hope that the vacant posts of judges in the Appellate and HC divisions would be filled soon.Legal experts meanwhile stressed the need for appointing competent, honest and courageous judges to the two divisions.Senior jurist and former Supreme Court Bar Association president barrister M Amir-Ul Islam said only increasing the umber of judges at the Appellate and HC divisions would not do the judiciary any good if the judges are not competent and honest."If incompetent judges are appointed, the number of pending cases would still increase causing suffering to litigants," he said.Renowned lawyer Dr Shahdeen Malik said, "The present government--being not a political one--is expected to appoint competent and impartial judges soon. I hope that judges will not be appointed on political consideration."Among the Appellate Division judges, Chief Justice MM Ruhul Amin will retire on December 23, 2009, Justice Md Joynul Abedin on January 1, 2010, Justice Md Tafazzal Islam on February 8, 2010, Justice Md Abdul Matin on February 26, 2010, and Justice Mohammad Fazlul Karim on September 30, 2010.
Published On: 2008-09-30
Ashutosh Sarkar
www.thedailystar.net
HC directive on NE undertrials http://www.assamtribune.com/scripts/details.asp?id=sep3008/at02
GUWAHATI, Sept 29 – Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court comprising Chief Justice J Chelameswar and Justice BK Sarma today directed that all undertrials languishing in different jails of five NE States – Assam, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh, who have completed 90 days or 60 days as the case may be shall be released on personal bonds in case chargesheet is not filed within the aforesaid period. The High Court had earlier registered a writ petition WP(C) (Taken up) No. 4299/06 on the basis of order dated August 2, 2006 passed by the Assam Human Rights Commission regarding violation of human rights of the prisoners in various jails of the State on the ground of non-availability of bailers. Human Rights Commission had taken up the case on the basis of a newspaper report published in the Assamese daily Asomia Pratidin wherein it was highlighted that one Mikel Kanyak has been leading a prisoner’s life in Dibrugarh jail for five years for want of a bailer. Similarly, there are many prisoners who could not be released due to non-availability of bailers. Considering the seriousness of the matter, High Court in its earlier order directed all the seven States on North East to file their affidavits as regards the position of undertrials or convicts in different jails. A status report on undertrials and convicts of different jails of the States, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh was submitted by the appointed amicus curie before the court on the basis of affidavits filed by five States.The court after hearing the respective subnissions of the Advocates General and government advocates of all the seven States and appointed amicus curie and also after going through the status report, directed that all undertrials who are in jails for 90 days or 60 days as the case may be shall be released on personal bond within a period of two weeks in case the chargesheet is not submitted within the statutory period of 90 days or 60 days. The court has also given the liberty to the States to place all the materials before the magistrate to show such undertrial prisoners who are arrested in heinous crimes only against surety and not on personal bond.The court further directed that those convicts who have completed the sentence as per their charges as shown in the status report submitted by the amicua curie should also be released forthwith. The court also directed that those who were arrested under Section 41 Cr PC should also be released forthwith unless specific charges are brought against them. Direction was also given that those prisoners who have completed half of the total sentence provided for the offence, shall be released on personal bond with or without surety under Section 436A Cr PC. In respect of convicts and lunatic prisoners, the hearing will take place on the next date fixed on 5.11.08.
LAW REPORTER
www.assamtribune.com
HC slams Home Ministry on homosexuality
http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/story.aspx?id=NEWEN20080067140
As the financial meltdown hit the world on Monday, the Home Ministry too was shocked.Home Minister Shivraj Patil is already drawing flak for failing to deal with terror. Now, his ministry is being slammed for being moralist and backward.Delhi High Court criticised the Home Ministry when it equated homosexuality with "widow remarriage." (Watch)The bench remarked that going by the government's stand on homosexuality and AIDS, it would be wise to ban sexual intercourse itself.The ministry is also at the receiving end of the bloggers.
NDTV Correspondent
Monday, September 29, 2008, (New Delhi)
www.ndtv.com
Parcel bomb murder: HC rejects bail plea of accused
http://www.zeenews.com/articles.asp?aid=472875&sid=REG
New Delhi, Sept 29: The Delhi High Court on Monday refused to grant bail to ex-Army officer S J Choudhary who was sentenced to life imprisonment for killing businessman Krishan Sikand in a parcel bomb explosion 26 years ago. Dismissing the bail application, a Division Bench of Justice B N Chaturvedi and Justice P K Bhasin said that the court would hear the appeal filed by him challenging the conviction order at the earliest and the Bench did not feel this was the time to suspend his sentence. Former Lt Colonel Choudhary was on May 3 sentenced to life imprisonment by a Delhi court for killing Sikand in a parcel bomb explosion to avenge the victim's alleged proximity with his estranged wife. Choudhary, 70, was also fined Rs 10,000 under section 302 (murder) of the IPC and sections 3 and 4 of the Explosives Act for procuring and using Pakistan-made hand grenade in the offence. Sikand, 40, had died in an explosion caused by the parcel bomb delivered at his Sunder Nagar residence here on October 2, 1982. The CBI, in its chargesheet, had imputed motive on Choudhary saying victim Sikand, a divorcee, was seeing the convict's wife and was earlier threatened to stay away from her. The wife of the convicted officer was living separately from him and later developed friendship with the victim and moved into his house in Sunder Nagar here, the CBI had said. Bureau Report
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Govt tells HC to ignore Ramadoss' views on allowing gay sex http://www.ptinews.com/pti/ptisite.nsf/0/51513391A0839557652574D30042DB69?OpenDocument
New Delhi, Sep 29 (PTI) The government, under flak for taking a contradictory stand on the homosexuality law, today told the Delhi High Court not to consider Union Health Minister Anbumani Ramadoss' views on allowing gay sex among consenting adults."It doesn't matter what the minister says. It is also not important what the affidavit says. It is for the court to decide the issue," Additional Solicitor General P P Malhotra said before a bench headed by Chief Justice A P Shah.The Centre's response came after the court on the last hearing had pulled it up for speaking in two voices on the homosexuality law.In a contradictory stand taken by Health and Home ministry, the former had suggested decriminalisation of gay sex while the latter said that the penal provision against such acts cannot be scrapped. PTI
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Modi innocent, Godhra fire preplanned, says Justice Nanavati http://www.organiser.org/dynamic/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=257&page=4
Just after the report was filed, many of the respondents this magazine spoke to across the country revealed two things: one, people would have been surprised only if the report said otherwise on Modi government’s role in the riots as things were as plain as daylight. The number of Hindus who were killed in the police firing only told a story of a tough state. The best part of the report is reserved for the post-Godhra riots when the secular parties had, as Salman Rushdie would put it, shown manufactured outrage. The conclusion that the train burning was a pre-planned conspiracy was based on the statements recorded of the passengers of Sabarmati Express.
Justice Nanavati Commission’s first report on Godhra is a slap on the face of all secular parties, to put it plainly. And expectedly, the spokespersons for the secular parties, be it the Congress, the Left, the Samajwadi, the RJD and their likes, have all been frothing in their mouth since the report was tabled on Thursday evening. Even the stock markets reacted the next day with a thumbs up to Modi, when Gujarat-based company stocks went up in the green in morning trade. The two major inferences drawn from the report amongst many others are that the Muslim mob which lit the Sabarmati Express coach full of pilgrims coming back from Ayodhya was a premeditated conspiracy. And second, the report clarifies Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi and the state police have performed their jobs as they were expected to. At least the incidents of large number of Hindus getting killed in the police firing to control the mobs were not lost on the commission. Just after the report was filed, many of the respondents this magazine spoke to across the country revealed two things: one, people would have been surprised only if the report said otherwise on Modi government’s role in the riots as things were as plain as daylight. The number of Hindus who were killed in the police firing only told a story of a tough state government. Second, there is so much of a relief that in the whole muddle of deliberate misinterpretations, misleading statements and witch-hunting there is one commission which has the courage to speak the truth. Though the first report filed by the commission is dealing more with the Godhra incident it has alluded to the state government’s role in controlling the mobs that took to the streets after the gruesome mass killing of Hindu pilgrims in the S6 coach of Sabarmati Express. Over 58 pilgrims on their way from Ayodhya were burnt to death in that incident. The commission comprising Justice GT Nanavati and Justice Akshay Mehta have to be commended for its sagacity if not its level-headedness in coming to those conclusions. The language used in the report is remarkably shorn of superlatives. The report dealt with the torching of the Sabarmati coach in February 2002 extensively. The commission has put paid to the counter-conspiracy theories which wanted to show the incident was an accident. To begin with a coach full of Hindu pilgrims getting lit up in a Muslim-dominated locality where the train stopped was too much of a coincidence. Interestingly, the point which the media misses here is that just after the Godhra incident there were very many stories floating around—mostly to do with reported rowdy behaviour of the karsevaks who had enraged the Muslims at Godhra station. One television channel incessantly provided fodder to the rumour mill saying that young Muslim girls were harassed by the pilgrims in the coach. Nanavati Commission states unambiguously that 140 litres of petrol was stored and kept by the mob at Godhra, waiting for the train with pilgrims to come by. The conspiracy, the commission added for good measure, was hatched at the Aman Guest House in Godhra. Expectedly, Hindu anger split on the streets. Nearly 1,000 people died in the communal riots following the Godhra incident. The Nanavati Commission has inadvertently proved to the world that the Justice Banerjee Commission instituted by the Union Railway Minister Lalu Prasad Yadav just before Bihar state elections which claimed that Godhra incident was an accident, remains in a shambles. “There is absolutely no evidence to show that either the Chief Minister or any of the ministers in his council or police officers had played any role in the Godhra incident,” said the report of Justice GT Nanavati, a former Supreme Court judge that went into the train burning incident. Well, it only reaffirmed what most Hindus felt in the country. The first part of the report was tabled in the state assembly on Thursday. Congress spokesman Abhishek Singhvi went to the extent of questioning the credibility of the commission. But the cake goes to Lalu Prasad Yadav who came on television channels to say that the world had already passed judgement on Narendra Modi and his government and so any commission cannot ‘rub the stain away’. If the world thought so, wonder how Modi keeps winning elections one after the other. Also, Lalu’s demeanour reveals a dangerous streak in thinking that pronouncement of justice has no value, and someone can be indicted just by making accusations. Worse still, the best part of the report is reserved for the post-Godhra riots when the secular parties had, as Salman Rushdie would put it, shown manufactured outrage. The conclusion that the train burning was a pre-planned conspiracy was based on the statements recorded of the passengers of Sabarmati Express. The passengers said that the stone pelting continued for 10-20 minutes to prevent the passengers from coming out of the coach. Again, not coincidentally, the attack was only on the coach which had the Hindu pilgrims. 140 litres of petrol was purchased by Razzak Kurkur and Salim Panwala to execute the conspiracy, the Commission emphasised. According to eyewitnesses, Shaukat Lalu and Mohammad Latika had possibly opened the sliding door connecting the S6 and S7 coaches and entered S6 through that door. One Hassan Lalu had thrown a burning rag which had led to the fire in the S6 coach, it said. The commission report elaborated that the conspiracy was hatched at the Aman Guest House on the directions of Maulvi Umarji and executed by Razzak Kurkur, Salim Panwala, Shaukat Lalu, Imran Sheri, Rafique Batuk and Shiraj Bala. “The conspiracy hatched by these persons further appears to be a part of a larger conspiracy to create terror and destabilise the administration”. On the state government’s role commission reiterated what has always been known to be true and that is, there is no evidence to show there was lapse in the role of the chief minister or his ministers in providing protection, relief and rehabilitation to the victims of communal riots or in the matter of not complying with the recommendations and direction given by the National Human Rights Commission.
By Aditya Pradhan
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India, Russia extend military commission tenure till 2020
http://www.ptinews.com/pti/ptisite.nsf/0/8DEFC76F6FEF0428652574D300356B02?OpenDocument
New Delhi, Sept 29 (PTI) India and Russia today decided to extend the tenure of an inter-governmental commission for military cooperation by another 10 years to 2020 and inched closer to resolving Gorshkov aircraft carrier price and T-90 tanks technology transfer issues.New Delhi and Moscow also decided to form an apex body headed by the defence secretaries of the two countries to coordinate operation of several working groups for military cooperation."We have taken an in principle decision to extend the tenure of the Inter-Governmental Commission (IGC) for Military and Technical Cooperation by another 10 years to 2020 from 2010, when the current Commission's 10-year term ends," Defence Minister A K Antony and his Russian counterpart Anatoly Serdyukov said at a joint press conference soon after their annual IGC meeting here."The apex body headed by the two defence secretaries will meet every six months to review the joint working groups' functioning and to sort out all issues concerning defence relations," Antony said.The two Defence Ministers said Indo-Russian military relations have evolved over the years from "buyer-vendor" to "partners" for joint development of weapons and equipment. PTI
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Judge appears before cash-at-judge's door probe panel
http://www.topnews.in/law/judge-appears-cash-judges-door-probe-panel
Chandigarh, Sept 29: Punjab and Haryana High Court lady judge, Nirmaljit Kaur on Monday appeared before a three-judge panel set up by Chief Justice of India (CJI) K G Balakrishnan to look into the cash-at-judge's door scandal.
The panel consisting of Allahabad High Court's Justice Hemant Laxman Gokhale, Jammu and Kashmir High Court's Justice K S Radhakrishnan and Delhi High Court's Justice Madan B Lokur was set up by the CJI on August 26 this year.
With the panel beginning its probe today, Justice Kaur, whose staff member is a complainant in the case in which five persons, including a former Haryana's Additional Advocate General (AAG) Sanjeev Bansal had been arrested, was asked to provide necessary inputs in the case.
According reports, the panel initiated the inquiry proceedings from Justice Kaur and may question Justice Nirmal Yadav, whose name appeared during the questioning of the five alleged accused in the case by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the Chandigarh Police.
The panel may also question Bansal, his clerk Parkash Ram, home guard jawan Nirmal Singh, a Delhi-based businessman Ravinder Singh Bhasin and property dealer Rajeev Gupta.
While the prime accused Bhasin is in CBI custody till September 30 in this case, four others including Bansal, Parkash Ram, Rajeev Gupta, and Nirmal Singh are in judicial lock up.
It may be recalled that the Chandigarh administration had last month referred the scandal, which is related to the alleged delivery of Rs 15 lakh at the house of Justice Kaur "mistakenly" by the clerk of Bansal on August 13, to the CBI on the ground that it may have inter-state ramifications.
Both the CBI probe and the judge's panel inquiry will proceed on simultaneously. (ANI)
Submitted by Raman Iyer on Mon, 09/29/2008 - 09:17.
www.topnews.in
Allahabad HC Landmark Judgment On RTI Act
http://ipc498a.wordpress.com/2008/09/29/allahabad-hc-landmark-judgment-on-rti-act/
Everybody interested in RTIs must read it completely.
Given below is a decision which comes from a division bench of theAllahabad High Court. This decision is landmark in the sense that it willcontribute immensely to the RTI law getting settled eventually at the SupremeCourt level - as and when that happens. Will just list the key issues settled atthis level at least.
1. No need for a citizen to give reasons why he seeks information, hisbackground is no reason for information to be denied to him under RTI2. PIO cant take a plea that its third party info while denying info u/s8.(1).(j), without first referring it to the third party3. PIO to hear the third party and then to decide where is the larger publicinterest - in disclosure or non-disclosure4. The MOST important issue: It has ruled in favor what we have always believedin and practiced in Gujarat. Section 18 to 20 are all interlinked and cant belooked at in isolation. Therefore a complaint against denial / deemed denial ofinformation u/s 18 which empowers a SIC / CIC with powers vested in a civilcourt under the code of Civil Procedure, cant be held hostage with section 19 of1st appeal. The CIC has been guilty of holding this stand since the Act cominginto effect. This decision views all these 3 sections and their respectivesub-sections as having one objective - securing access to information andkeeping truant officers in check5. A SIC / CIC can hearing a complaint can require a public authority to provideinformation at the same time penalize him to ensure that its done
http://elegalix.allahabadhighcourt.in/elegalix/WebShowJudgment.do?judgmentID=633\75Writ Petition No. 3262 (MB) of 2008Public Information OfficerVs.State Information Commission, U.P. and others.
Hon’ble Pradeep Kant, J.Hon’ble Shri Narayan Shukla, J.(Delivered by Hon’ble Pradeep Kant, J.)
Following two questions arise for determination in the present writ petition:(1) Whether the information disclosing the names of the persons includingaddress and amount, who have received more than Rs.1 lac from the Chief MinisterDiscretionary Fund, can be given to the information seeker or it is aninformation, which stands exempted under Section 8 (j) of the Right toInformation Act.(2) Whether the Chief Information Commissioner while considering the complaintsunder Section 18 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 is competent only toaward the prescribed punishment, in case of failure of information being givenas per the provisions of the Act or while dealing with the said complaints, anydirection can also be issued for furnishing the information which has not beenprovided, though it is not found to be exempted under the provisions of the Act.
Right to Information Act, 2005 (referred to as the ‘RTI Act’) enacted by theParliament, received assent of the President on 15.6.2005, and which came intoforce w.e.f. 12.10.2005, is relatively a new legislation and, therefore, ishaving its teething problem giving rise to various issues, which requireconsideration by the Court.
Needless to mention that the Act is not meant for creating a new type oflitigation or a new forum of litigation between the information seeker and theinformation giver, but may be that some of the informations asked for, beinconvenient to the persons to whom it relates and, therefore, every effortwould be made to refuse divulgence of such an information and for that mattereither to refuse the information by delaying the process or passing a specificorder of refusal, may be some time by taking shelter under the provisions ofSections 8 and 9 of the Act, which are the exemption clauses.
The information covered by the aforesaid provisions is either completelyexempted or it has been given limited protection i.e. though the information isotherwise exempted but can be disclosed on the satisfaction of the PublicInformation Officer, if he is satisfied that the disclosure of such aninformation is in larger public interest.
Our Constitution establishes a democratic republic. Democracy requires aninformed citizenry and transparency of information which are vital to itsfunctioning and also to contain corruption and to hold Governments and theirinstrumentalities accountable to the governed. The revelation of information inactual practice is likely to conflict with other public interests includingefficient operations of the Governments, optimum use of limited fiscal resourcesand the preservation of confidentiality of sensitive information and, therefore,with a view to harmonise these conflicting interests while preserving theparamountcy of the democratic ideal, the Parliament enacted the Act of 2005 toprovide for furnishing certain information to citizens who desire to have it.
RTI Act in fact, has been enacted to provide for setting out the practicalregime of right to information for citizens to secure access to informationunder the control of public authorities, in order to promote transparency andaccountability in the working of every public authority, the constitution of aCentral Information Commission and State Information Commissions and for mattersconnected therewith or incidental thereto.
‘Right to Information’ is the right to obtain information from any publicauthority by means of, (i) inspection, taking of extracts and notes; (ii)certified copies of any records of such public authority; (iii) diskettes,floppies or in any other electronic mode or through printouts where suchinformation is stored in a computer or in any other device. Information in thiscontext means any material in any form relating to the administration,operations or decisions of a public authority.
The Act provides for making information held by executive agencies of the Stateavailable to the public unless it comes within any one of the specificcategories of matters exempt from public disclosure. Virtually all agencies ofthe executive branch of the government are required by the Act to issueregulations to implement the provisions of the Act. These regulations inform thepublic where certain types of information may be readily obtained, however,other information may be obtained on request, and what internal agency appealsare available if a member of the public is refused the requested information.
The Right to Information Act is designed to prevent abuse of discretionary powerof the governmental agencies by requiring them to make public certaininformation about their working and work product. Right to information or rightto know is an integral part and basic tenet of the freedom of speech andexpression, a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of theConstitution. It also flows from Article 21 as enunciated by the apex court inthe case of *Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. vs. Proprietors of Indian ExpressNewspapers Bombay Pvt. Ltd. And others, (1988) 4 SCC 592. The apex court in thiscase while dealing with the issue of freedom of press and administration ofjustice, held that “we must remember that the people at large have a right toknow in order to be able to take part in a participatory development in theindustrial life and democracy. Right to know is a basic right which citizens ofa free country aspire in the broader horizonof the right to live in this age in our land under Article 21 of ourConstitution. That right has reached new dimensions and urgency. That right putsgreater responsibility upon those who take upon themselves the responsibility toinform”.
It is thus, a fundamental right, which cannot be denied, unless of course itfalls within the exemption clause or otherwise is protected by some statutoryprovisions.
The functioning of the State and its instrumentalities and functionaries underthe cover of darkness leave the citizens ignorant about the reasons andrationale of any decision taken by the authorities or any policy made and theimplications thereof, whereas the citizens have a guaranteed ‘Right to Know’.The legal and consequential corollary of the aforesaid right will be that aperson getting the required information may move for redressal of the wrong doneor any action taken, order passed or policy made by approaching the appropriateforum, as may be permissible under law. The purpose and object of the act is notonly to provide information but to keep a check on corruption, and for thatmatter confers a right upon the citizens to have the necessary information, sothat appropriate action may be initiated or taken against the erring officersand also against the arbitrary and illegal orders.
The Supreme Court even before the advent of the Right to Information Act, 2005had stressed upon the importance of transparency in administration andgovernance of the country and for that matter time and again has entertainedwrit petitions requiring the State to disclose the information asked for.
Reference can be made to the case of State of U.P. vs. Raj Narain, (1975) 4 SCC428**. *A Constitution Bench of the apex court in this case, considered the pleaof privilege of not disclosing the information with respect to the tourarrangement of Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi for her tour programmes of Raebareli andalso the information disclosing any general order for security arrangementduring the general elections alongwith disclosure of all correspondence betweenthe Government of India and the State Government, and between the Chief Ministerand the Prime Minister, and held unanimously that the informations asked for,are to be disclosed. The appeal against the judgement of the Allahabad HighCourt was allowed. His Lordship Justice Mathew, in a separate concurringjudgement, in Para-74 observed as under:“In a government of responsibility like ours, where all the agents of the publicmust be responsible for their conduct, there can be but few secrets. The peopleof this country have a right to know every public act, everything that is donein a public way, by their public functionaries. They are entitled to know theparticulars of every public transaction in all its bearing. The right to know,which is derived from the concept of freedom of speech, though not absolute, isa factor which should make one wary, when secrecy is claimed for transactionswhich can, at any rate,have no repercussion on public security. To cover withveil of secrecy, the common routine business, is not in the interest of thepubic. Such secrecy can seldom be legitimately desired. It is generally desiredfor the purpose of parties and politics or personal self-interest orbureaucratic routine. The responsibility of officials to explain and to justifytheir acts is the chiefsafeguard against oppression and corruption.”
As a result of constant demand of disclosure of information and to make thepeople know about the functioning of the Government, its authorities andfunctionaries and the manner in which, decisions are taken or even policy made,including their implementation and to uproot corruption, redtapism and delay infunctioning of the State functionaries, apart from decisions taken in individualcases the central legislation in the shape of Right to Information Act, 2005 hasbeen enacted, which prescribes the substantive as well as procedural provisionsfor securing the information by any person, who seeks that information, withoutrequiring him to disclose the reason as to why this information is being askedfor.
The Act obligates every public authority as defined in Section 2(h) to designateas many officers, as Central Public Information Officers or State PublicInformation Officers, as the case may be, in all administrative units or officeunder it as may be necessary to provide information to persons requesting forthe information under Section 5 of the Act.Section 2(j) says that “right to information” means the right to informationaccessible under this Act which is held by or under the control of any publicauthority and includes the right to-(i) inspection of work, documents, records;(ii) taking notes, extracts or certified copies of documents or records;(iii) taking certified samples of material;(iv) obtaining information in the form of diskettes, floppies, tapes, videocassettes or in any other electronic mode or through printouts where suchinformation is stored in a computer or in any other device,’whereas Section 3 says that ’subject to the provisions of this Act, all citizensshall have the right to information. ‘Section 4(1) obligates that* (a) every public authority shall maintain all itsrecords duly catalogued and indexed in a manner and the form which facilitatesthe right to information under this Act and ensure that all records that areappropriate to be computerised are, within a reasonable time and subject toavailability of resources, computerised and connected through a network all overthe country on different systems so that access to such records is facilitated.(b) publish within one hundred and twenty days from the enactment of this Act-(i) the particulars of its organisation, functions and duties;(ii) the powers and duties of its officers and employees;(iii) the procedure followed in the decision making process, including channelsof supervision and accountability;(iv) the norms set by it for the discharge of its functions;(v) the rules, regulations, instructions, manuals and records, held by it orunder its control or used by its employees for discharging its functions;(vi) a statement of the categories of documents that are held by it or under itscontrol;(vii) the particulars of any arrangement that exists for consultation with, orrepresentation by, the members of the public in relation to the formulation ofits policy or implementation thereof;(viii) a statement of the boards, councils, committees and other bodiesconsisting of two or more persons constituted as its part or for the purpose ofits advice, and as to whether meetings of those boards, councils, committees andother bodies are open to the public, or the minutes of such meetings areaccessible for public;(ix) a directory of its officers and employees;(x) the monthly remuneration received by each of its officers and employees,including the system of compensation as provided in its regulations;(xi) the budget allocated to each of its agency, indicating the particulars ofall plans, proposed expenditures and reports on disbursements made;(xii) the manner of execution of subsidy programmes, including the amountsallocated and the details of beneficiaries of such programmes;(xiii) particulars of recipients of concessions, permits or authorisationsgranted by it;(xiv) details in respect of the information, available to or held by it, reducedin an electronic form;(xv) the particulars of facilities available to citizens for obtaininginformation, including the working hours of a library or reading room, ifmaintained for public use;(xvi) the names, designation and other particulars of the Public InformationOfficers;(xvii) such other information as may be prescribed, and thereafter update thesepublications every year’. Apart from the informations aforesaid, the Act permitsany person to seek information in the prescribed manner by moving an applicationto the Public Information Officer, giving the details of the information askedfor and also depositing the requisite fee, as may be prescribed.
Section 6 of the Act says that a person, who desires to obtain any informationunder this Act, shall make a request in writing or through electronic means inEnglish or Hindi or in the official language of the area in which theapplication is being made, accompanying such fee as may be prescribed, to-“(a) the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer,as the case may be, of the concerned public authority;(b) the Central Assistant Public Information Officer or State Assistant PublicInformation Officer, as the case may be, specifying the particulars of theinformation sought by him or her. Provided that where such request cannot bemade in writing, the Central Public Information Officer or State PublicInformation Officer, as the case may be, shall render all reasonable assistanceto the person making the request orally to reduce the same in writing.Sub-clause (2) says that an applicant making request for information shall notbe required to give any reason for requesting the information or any otherpersonal details except those that may be necessary for contacting him.”
Section 7 of the Act provides the mode and manner of disposal of request made,seeking information, which prescribes a maximum period of thirty days forproviding such information from the date of receipt of the application onpayment of such fee, as may be prescribed. It also says that the application mayeither be accepted or may be rejected for the reasons specified in Sections 8and/or 9.
The proviso annexed to Section 7(1) says that where the information sought forconcerns the life or liberty of a person, the same shall be provided withinforty eight hours of the receipt of the request.
Sub-clause (2) says that if the Central Public Information Officer or StatePublic Information Officer, as the case may be, fails to give decision on therequest for information within the period specified under sub-clause (1), theCentral Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as thecase may be, shall be deemed to have refused the request.
Section 7 in effect prescribes not only the procedure, which is to be adoptedafter receipt of the request of seeking information but also prescribes the timelimit, in which such information is to be given, the payment of requisite feeand various other procedure, which may be required to be fulfilled while seekingand giving the information.
The present controversy does not relate to the prescription of fee and themanner in which additional fee can be asked for, but is confined to thequestions, formulated in the opening part of this order. If the information isnot given within the time period prescribed for giving information, it would bedeemed to have been refused, even if information is not specifically refused ordenied. The information can be refused only in case there exists any reasonspecified in Section 8 or Section 9. Sub-clause (8) of Section 7, makes itmandatory to communicate the person making the request; (i) the reasons for suchrejection; (ii) the period within which an appeal against such rejection may bepreferred; (iii) the particular of the appellate authority.
Section 8 provides exemption from disclosure of information and it categoricallyprovides the specified informations, where disclosure of the information shallnot be obligatory notwithstanding the provisions of the Act, 2005..
A perusal of the aforesaid provisions of Section 8, reveals that there arecertain informations contained in Sub-clause (a), (b), (c), (f), (g) and (h),for which there is no obligation for giving such an information to any citizen;whereas informations protected under sub-clause (d), (e) and (j) are thoughprotected informations, but on the discretion and satisfaction of the competentauthority, that it would be in larger public interest to disclose suchinformation, such information can be disclosed. These informations thus, arehaving limited protection, the disclosure of which is dependent upon thesatisfaction of the competent authority that it would be in larger publicinterest as against the protected interest to disclose such information.
Sub-clause (i) protects the information with respect to cabinet papers includingrecords or deliberations of the Council of Ministers, Secretaries and otherofficers, for a definite period after which protection umbrella stands erodedwhen the decision is taken and the matter is complete or over, provided furtherthat those matters which come under the exemptions specified in this sectionshall not be disclosed. There can be no quarrel or any dispute with respect tothe information which are completely protected or to say totally exempted frombeing disclosed as no citizen can claim a right to have such an information, butthe dispute arises where exemption is being claimed under any of the aforesaidprovisions of Section-8, but the question arises as to whether information askedfor is covered by any of the exemption detailed in the said section or not.
The controversy arises where exemption is claimed under limited protectionprovided under sub-clause (d), (e) and (j), and the information seeker requestsfor disclosure of the information, but the Public Information Officer refuses tosupply such information on the ground that information stands exempted. In suchcases, the role of the appellate authority or that of the Commission includingthat of the Chief Information Commissioner is very important, depending upon thejurisdiction exercised and the satisfaction arrived by such authority indeciding as to whether;(i) information asked for, at all stands exempted under any of the aforesaidprovisions; and (ii) even if it is exempted, should it be disclosed in largerpublic interest as against the protected interest of the individuals. In case ofthird party information, the provisions of Section 11 are to be taken intoaccount, which prescribe a procedure of affording opportunity to the third partyto whom the information relates, or who has given the information and who hastreated the said information in confidentiality, by giving him notice to haveits views and, thereafter, it is to be decided as to whether the informationshould be disclosed or not, as per the satisfaction of the competent authority.
In case of refusal of information either by specific order by Public InformationOfficer or under the deeming provision of refusal, the matter can be taken up inappeal under Section 19, before the first appellate authority as may beprescribed and further in second appeal to the Central Information Commission orthe State Information Commission, as the case may be. The provision of appealhas been made for third party also under sub-clause (2) of Section 19. Theperiod for deciding the first appeal is thirty days with total extended time of45 days. The limitation for filing the appeal is also thirty days, but thisperiod can be condoned on sufficient cause being shown by the appellant, by theappellate authority. The second appeal has to be filed within 90 days from thedate on which the decision should have been made or was actually received. TheCentral Information Commission or State Information Commission, as the case maybe, may admit the appealafter the expiry of the period of ninety days if it is satisfied that theappellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time. Inappeal, reasonable opportunity is to be given to the third party also, if thematter relates to third party.
Sub-clause (7) of Section 19 says that the decision of the Central InformationCommission or State Information Commission, as the case may, shall be binding,and sub-clause (8) says that in its decision, the Central Information Commissionor State Information Commission, as the case may be, has the power to-“(a) require the public authority to take any such steps as may be necessary tosecure compliance with the provisions of this Act, including-(i) by providing access to information, if so requested, in a particular form;(ii) by appointing a Central Public Information Officer or a State PublicInformation Officer, as the case may be;(iii) by publishing certain information or categories of information;iv) by making necessary changes to its practices in relation to the maintenance,management and destruction of records;(v) by enhancing the provision of training on the right to information for itsofficials;(vi) by providing it with an annual report in compliance with clause (b) ofsub-section (1) of Section 4;(b) require the public authority to compensate the complainant for any loss orother detriment suffered.(c) impose any of the penalties provided under this Act;(d) reject the application. “
Section 19 (8) thus, authorises the Commission to require the public authorityto take any such steps as may be necessary to secure compliance with theprovisions of the Act, and sub-clause (c) also permits to impose any of thepenalties provided under this Act. The penalty has been provided under Section20 of the Act, which can be imposed in the given circumstances mentionedtherein.
Sub-clause (1) of Section 20 gives the circumstance, under which the penalty canbe imposed and it permits a penalty of Rs.250/- each day till application isreceived or information is furnished, so however, the total amount of suchpenalty shall not exceed Rs.25000/-. Sub-clause (2) of Section 20 gives power torecommend for disciplinary action against the Central Public Information Officeror a State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, under the servicerules applicable to him, in case the Central Information Officer or the StateInformation Officer, as the case may be, has denied the request for informationor knowingly given incorrect, incomplete or misleading information or destroyedinformation which was the subject of the request or obstructed in any manner infurnishing the information.
Section 18 is the provision for making complaint and lays down the procedure forentertaining a complaint and making enquiry.Section 18 reads as under:“18(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, it shall be the duty of theCentral Public Information Commission or State Information Commission,, as thecase may be, to receive and inquire into a complaint from any person- (a) whohas been unable to submit a request to a Central Public Information Officer orState Public Information Officer, as the case may be, either by reason that nosuch officer has been appointed under this Act, or because the Central AssistantPublic Information Officer or State Assistant Public Information Officer, as thecase may be, has refused to accept his or her application for information orappeal under this Act for forwarding the same to the Central Public InformationOfficer or State Public Information Officer, or senior officer specified insub-section (1) of Section 19 or the Central Public Information Officer or StatePublic Information Officer, as the case may be;(b) who has been refused access to any information requested under this Act;(c) who has not been given a response to a request for information or access toinformation within the time limit specified under this Act;d) who has been required to pay an amount of fee which he or she considersunreasonable;(e) who believes that he or she has been given incomplete, misleading or falseinformation under this Act; and(f) in respect of any other matter relating to requesting or obtaining access torecords under this Act.(2) Where the Central Public Information Commission or State InformationCommission, as the case may be, is satisfied that there are reasonable groundsto inquire into the matter, it may initiate an inquiry in respect thereof..(3) The Central Information Commission or State Information Commission, as thecase may be, shall while inquiring into any matter under this section, have thesame powers as are vested in a civil court while trying a suit under the Code ofCivil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), in respect of the following matters, namely:-(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of persons and compel them to giveoral or written evidence on oath and to produce the documents or things;(b) requiring the discovery and inspection of documents;(c) receiving evidence on affidavit;(d) requisitioning any public record or copies thereof from any court or office;(e) issuing summons for examination of witnesses or documents; and(f) any other matter which may be prescribed.
(4) Notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other Act ofParliament or State Legislature, as the case may be, the Central InformationOfficer or State Information Commission, as the case may be, during inquiring ofany complaint under this Act, examine any record to which this Act applies whichis under the control of the public authority, and no such record may be withheldfrom it on any ground.”
Section 18 thus is a provision which is a consciously introduced section, so asto exercise complete control over the functioning of the Public InformationOfficers, at the time of receiving application, and at the time of givinginformation or during the appeal under the Act. Any applicant who has not beengiven a response to a request for information or access to information withinthe time limit specified under the Act, or who has been required to pay anamount of fee which he or she considers unreasonable, or has been given falseinformation, and in respect of any other matter relating to requesting orobtaining access to records under the Act, may approach the Commission, whowould enquire into the complaint, and while making an enquiry, it has all thepowers as are vested in a civil court while trying a suit under the Code ofCivil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), in respect of the matters enumerated therein.
The Commission under sub-clause (4), which begins with a non obstante clause,during enquiry of any complaint under the Act, can examine any record to whichthis Act applies which is under the control of the public authority, and no suchrecord shall be withheld from it on any ground. In the light of the aforesaidprovisions of the Act, the matter in issue requires consideration. Learnedcounsel for the petitioner has argued that the information asked for, namely,names and details of all the persons who have received more than Rs.1 lac fromthe Chief Minister’s Discretionary Fund during the period 28.8.2003 upto31.3.2007, cannot be provided as it stands exempted under Section 8(j) of theAct.
The second argument is that the Commission while dealing with the complaintsunder Section 18, could not direct the Public Information Officer to supply theinformation within a specified time, regarding which complaint has been made, asunder Section 20, it is only the penalty which can be imposed on the erringofficer, but information cannot be directed to be given, as such a directioncould be issued only in appeal, whether first or second and the presentapplicant having not preferred the second appeal, his prayer for disclosure ofthe information asked for, in proceeding under Section 20 could not have beenentertained.
Section 8 (j) of the Act gives limited protection. The information asked forunder the aforesaid clause, can stand protected, if it satisfies, either of thefollowing conditions :(i) it should be an information which relates to personal information, and thedisclosure of such information has no relationship to any public activity orinterest(ii) or it would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual.”The discretion, which has been given to the Central Public Information Officeror State Public Information Officer or the appellate authority, as the case maybe, is to the effect that on their satisfaction that the larger public interestjustifies the disclosure of such information, the same may be supplied. It meansthat though the information asked for is otherwise exempted from being supplied,but it can be disclosed if larger public interest justifies the disclosure ofsuch information. Who will decide this larger public interest? It is not theapplicant or the person against whom the information is asked for, but theinformation officer or the competent authority, as the case may be. Of course,while deciding the aforesaid question, the views of both the parties can betaken into account or so to say have to be taken into account by the concernedauthority under the RTI Act, for the reason that the person who is asking forthe information, wouldsay it is in larger public interest to disclose the information, whereas theperson against whom the information is being asked for shall dispute theaforesaid fact.
The information regarding the money advanced beyond Rs.1 lac to any person fromthe Chief Minister’s Discretionary Fund, apparently is not an information whichcould be said to be protected under the provisions of Section 8 and inparticular Section 8(j) of the Act. The petitioner’s case is that if such aninformation is disclosed, it would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy ofthe individual. The individual means the person who is the beneficiary of suchamount. Elaborating the aforesaid plea, reliance has been placed upon theapplication /objections filed by the petitioner before the ommission, wherein ithas been said that the persons who have received or would have received thediscretionary fund of the Chief Minister also have a social status and selfrespect and if their names are disclosed, that will be an unwarranted invasionin their privacy.
For testing the aforesaid plea, the nature of such grant has to be seen and itis also to be tested, whether the Chief Minister’s Discretionary Fund is immuneto any sort of scrutiny or audit or that such fund can be used or diverted inany manner, as the Chief Minister desires and that no limitation or restrictionhas been imposed under the scheme, under which this fund is to be provided orits disbursement stands protected under the provisions of Section 8. A keen lookupon the scheme of Chief Minister’s Discretionary Fund, and the Rules whichgovern it, is necessary for dealing with the issue involved.
In supersession of the U.P. Chief Minister’s Discretionary Fund Rules, 1989,Rules of 1999 were enforced by the Governor of the State in exercise of hispowers under Article 283(2) of the Constitution of India. Article 283 (1)…Article 282 and 283, which fall under Chapter-I, Part-12 of the Constitutiondealing with finance, has been placed under the heading ‘Miscellaneous FinancialProvisions’.Article 282 deals with the expenditure defrayable by the Union or a State out ofits revenues, lays down as under: “*The Union or a State may make any grants forany public purpose, notwithstanding that the purpose is not one with respect towhich Parliament or the Legislature of the State, as the case may be, may makelaws.”
Article 283 is about the custody, etc, of Consolidated Funds Contingency Fundsand moneys credited to the public accounts, wherein sub-clause (2) provides that*’Consolidated Fund of the State and the Contingency Fund of the State and thecustody of public money other than those credited to such funds received by oron behalf of the Government of the State, their payment into the public accountof the State and withdrawal of moneys from such account and all other mattersconnected with or ancillary to matters aforesaid shall be regulated by law madeby the Legislature of the State, and, until provision in that behalf is so made,shall be regulated by rules made by the Governor of the State’. It is inpursuance of the aforesaid power vested with the Governor, the Rules of 1989 andthereafter, the Rules of 1999 have been framed.
The Rules of 1999 were amended by notification issued on 22.11.2005, withrespect to certain clauses and again vide notification dated 22.11.2006, issuedby the Governor in exercise of his powers under Article 283(2) of theConstitution of India. Amendments / modifications made in the Rules of 1999 areonly with respect to the entitlement category and the amount which can beawarded to the person entitled for such discretionary fund, rest of the Rules of1999 are still in force. In the Rules of 1999, Rule-2 provides that the adequateor sufficient amount, with the sanction/consent of the Legislature of the State(Rajya Vidhan Mandal), shall be placed in the Chief Minister’s DiscretionaryFund, which shall be granted to the individuals or to the institutions by theChief Minister. The explanation given therein deals with the situation whenthere is President’s Rule in the State.
Rule-3, lays down the conditions under which the grant/payment from the ChiefMinister’s Discretionary Fund can be given. Sub-clause (1) says that the grantshall be made to such persons or institutions, who are eligible for such a grantfrom the State fund. Sub-clause (2) says that the grant shall not be recurringand it would not mean that it would be spent in any personal type of expenditurenor such an expenditure would be borne by the discretionary fund. Sub-clause (3)of Rule-3, lays down the category of persons to whom the grant can be made andalso the maximum amount which can be paid to such persons including theinstitutions.
Sub-clause (4) gives the discretion to the Chief Minister to award the amount inexcess of the amount prescribed to any person in any special matter, as per hisor her discretion, as the case may be, whereas sub-clause (5) prescribes foraudit of the discretionary fund by the Accountant General, making it obligatoryfor the Chief Minister’s office, to forward him a copy of the order of grantmade in favour of any person. Sub-clause (6)(Ka) and (6)(Kha) confers power uponthe Chief Minister or the officer nominated by him to make inspection of therecord of the person, to whom the grant has been made, if it is a grant of morethan Rs.5,000/-. Sub-clause (6)(Kha) says that the District Magistrate shallmake verification and shall certify about the utilization of the grant made andhe will make relevant records available at the time of audit. The DistrictMagistrate shall also ensure that the grant has been made to the eligiblepersons.
Sub-clause (7) requires the beneficiary to give a certificate that he has nottaken the benefit of any discretionary fund of any Minister and has not appliedfor any discretionary fund of any Minister and that in the relevant year, he isnot a beneficiary of such a grant. It is only after giving such a certificate,the grant shall be disbursed. Sub-clause (8) says that the beneficiary has toutilise the amount of grant from the Chief Minister’s Discretionary Fund withinthe prescribed period and if he fails to do so, he will have to return theunused money in one go. Sub-clause (9) obliges the District Magistrate to giveutilization certificate of the amount paid to the beneficiary, and sub-clause(10) says that the order of sanction form the discretionary fund and the accountdisbursed, shall be maintained in the Account Section of the Chief Minister’soffice.
Sub-clause (11) says that where the amount of such discretionary fund is morethan Rs.500/-, the beneficiary will have to give a stamp receipt inacknowledgement thereof. By means of the amendment/modificat ion by thenotification dated 22.11.2005, sub-clause (3) which deals with the category ofpersons entitled for the grant and the amount which can be given to a particularperson including institutions has been amended, enhancing the said amount tocertain extent and lastly by the amendment of 2006, amendments have been made insub-clauses (3), (4) and (6) to the same effect, i.e. the category of persons towhom the grant can be made from the discretionary fund of the Chief Minister andthe maximum amount that can be paid to such persons, etc.
The Chief Minister’s Discretionary Fund thus, is a part and parcel of theConsolidated Fund of the State, subject to all constitutional sanctions andstatutory bindings. It is in fact the public money and, therefore, public has aright to know about it. The Chief Minister’s Discretionary Fund thus, is not andcannot be treated as personal fund of the Chief Minister, but it is thediscretionary fund, which has to be disbursed, at his/her discretion, as thecase may be, which disbursement again is governed by the Rules. The discretionhas to be exercised in the manner as may be prescribed under the Rules.
The amount of Rs.1 lac or more can be given to persons, who are enumerated inRule 3(b) to 3(f). Rule-3 read as under: “(3)This grant may be given by theChief Minister to the persons upto the limit mentioned below according to hisdiscretion: (a) to helpless, Disabled, persons of poor classes or boys orwidows: Not more than Rs.1,00,000/ - (b) to institutions involved into socialand cultural activities (other than institution based on caste or religion : Notmore than Rs. 5,00,000 /- (c) to poor persons suffering from illness : Not morethan Rs. 5,00,000/- (d) to for the construction of building of non governmentaleducational institutions : Not more than Rs. 5,00,000/- (e) to poor familieswhose earning member is killed in a brutal murder / crime or died due toaccident, snake bite or drowning of boat: Not more than Rs. 5,00,000/- (f) topersons suffering from massive fire breakout, land sliding, snowfall or othernatural calamities : half of the lossoccurred on general standards or Rs. 200,000/- whichever is less. (g) to personseriously injured in (one) accident and is in need of money: Not more than Rs.1,00,000/- (h) to needy person injured in (two)accidents: Not more than Rs.25,000/-”
The rules aforesaid thus prescribed the category of persons, who are entitledfor the benefit of discretionary fund of the Chief Minister with the maximumamount that can be given to them, of course subject to discretion of the ChiefMinister, who is authorised to give an amount even in excess of the prescribedlimit, but it does not lay down anywhere that the discretionary fund can begiven to persons not entitled under the rules. Even supposing (though the Rulesdo not permit) that the Chief Minister has the power to extend the benefit ofthe discretionary fund to any class of person/persons with discretion of anysuch amount being paid, none the less, it is governed by the rules and,therefore, if any amount is paid to a person, as enumerated under the rule orthat the amount has been paid in excess of the amount prescribed, the amountpaid even then cannot be treated to be an action of the Chief Minister or theChief Minister’s Secretariat, which isnot amenable to the public knowledge.
The discretion which is governed by the rule cannot be treated as insulated withimmunity so as to cover it up and not to make it known to the person,* *who isasking for such an information. No rule or provision, either constitutional orstatutory has been placed before us to draw a presumption of secrecy withrespect to the amounts disbursed and the details of such person or in otherwords, with respect to the disbursement of the discretionary fund from the ChiefMinister Secretariat, to the persons who are the beneficiary of suchdisbursement. In the case of Coimbatore District Central Coop.. Bank v.Employees Assn. (2007) 4 SCC 669, the court dealing with the doctrine ofproportionality, a principle where the Court is concerned with the process,method or manner in which the decision maker has ordered his priorities, reacheda conclusion or arrived at a decision, observed that the doctrine ofproportionality has its genesis in the field of administrative law. TheGovernment and its departments, in administering the affairs of the country, areexpected to honour their statements of policy or intention and treat thecitizens with full personal consideration without abuse of discretion. There canbe no “pick and choose”, selective applicability of the government norms orunfairness, arbitrariness or unreasonableness. The very essence of decisionmaking consists in the attribution of relative importance to the factors andconsiderations in the case. The doctrine of proportionality thus steps in focustrue nature of exercise, the elaboration of a rule ofpermissible priorities. “Proportionality” involves “balancing test” and“necessity test”, whereas the former (balancing test) permits scrutiny ofexcessive onerous penalties or infringement of rights or interests and amanifest imbalance of relevant considerations, the latter (necessity test)requires infringement of human rights to the least restrictive alternative.
The Chief Minister while distributing the amount to the persons entitled to havethe benefit of the aforesaid public fund, has the discretion to make such grantto the eligible persons and while exercising the discretion, he/she as the casemay be, has the discretion to enhance the amount as against the amount normallyprescribed for each category, but the discretion to whom the amount under thediscretionary fund should be paid and what amount should be paid also has to beexercised with caution and care and on a reasonable basis, e.g., in any specialmatter where the amount specified is found to be very low, so as to meet theexigency for which the amount is to be paid, the Chief Minister would have thediscretion to make a larger payment which means that the discretion of givingenhanced amount is also circumscribed by the requirement of it being a ’specialmatter’. For example, in case a poor person needs to have the medical expensesfor kidneytransplant, lever transplant, bypass surgery or any other disease like canceretc. requiring huge expenditure in his treatment, the enhanced amount can begiven. Illustrations aforesaid are not exhaustive, as there may be many morecases, under different entitlements, where the Chief Minister could exercise thediscretion of providing any enhanced or increased amount as against the oneprescribed. Whenever a discretion is vested with any authority to do or not todo a thing, it has to be done by exercise of sound discretion, as per the rulesand guidelines given under the rules.
When the Rules themselves prescribe the categories of persons to whom thebenefit can be extended with the eligibility criteria, the maximum amount whichcan be paid to such defined persons, there being requirement of making audit bythe Accountant General, U.P., of the Chief Minister’s Discretionary Fund withpowers to the Chief Minister and District Magistrate to look into the records ofthe beneficiaries and verify that the amount has been received by the eligiblepersons, coupled with the fact that the beneficiary is also under the obligationto utilise the fund given to him within the prescribed period for the purpose itwas given, failing which, unused amount has to be refunded in one go, it cannotbe said that there can be any secrecy in the matter either with respect to thedisbursement of the discretionary fund to any particular person or his/herentitlement for the same nor it would be a case of infringing any right ofprivacy of a person, towhom the benefit has been extended.
There appears to be no reason for not making such information known to thepublic or atleast not making it known to the persons, who asks for suchinformation, when the disbursement is made under the Rules notified by theGovernor. Extending the benefit to the eligible and deserving persons, is alaudable object and a highly appreciative function of the Chief Minister and,therefore, also the disclosure of such an information would not affect thecredibility of the Chief Minister’s Secretariat or its functioning, but wouldmake the entire functioning transparent, which would enable the applicant toknow that the discretionary funds have been properly utilized. In a democraticset up, every organ of the State including the legislature and the executive isanswerable and accountable to the public. There cannot be a bar nor anyimpediment can be placed in disclosing such an information which relates to thebenefits extended from the discretionary fund ofthe Chief Minister to the persons entitled to such benefit. Chief Minister’sDiscretionary Fund is a name, but none the less it is a public fund and publicmoney. The citizens have a right to know that in what manner, the saiddiscretionary fund has been used and utilized. From the category of persons towhom this benefit can be extended, it is clear that it takes into account notonly the destitute, disabled weaker section of people, widows, children, but italso prescribes the given amount for social and cultural organizations, poorperson suffering from disease, for construction of the school building of anynon-governmental educational institution etc. etc. That being so, there cannotbe any plausible reason for not disclosing the information regardingdisbursement of the discretionary fund to any person.
The plea that if such an information is disclosed, it would cause unwarrantedinvasion of the privacy of the person who is a beneficiary is concerned, thesame is wholly untenable and devoid of substance. The person who is extended thebenefit of discretionary fund does not compromise with his honour and prestigenor acceptance of such a benefit belittles his status. The Chief Minister whileextending the benefit of the given amount from the Chief Minister’sDiscretionary Fund, discharges his/her, as the case may be, social obligation,in consonance with the socio economic policy of the State to the person, who isentitled under the rules for having the said benefit. The extension of theeconomic assistance to the persons entitled, is a step towards discharging thefunctions of a welfare State by providing monetary help to the deserving underthe Rules.
The benefit is supposed to be extended possibly to the maximum number ofpersons, who fall within the category of entitlement, which care has been takenby providing the maximum amount against each category of person, which can benormally provided. This has been done with a view to meet the economic capacityand the amount, available in the Chief Minister’s Discretionary Fund. The amountappears to have been prescribed against each category, with a view to make thefunds available to maximum possible number of people and not allowing thediscretion to be exercised in a manner, so that it concentrates into the handsof few beneficiaries. Of course, those who are not entitled for thediscretionary fund, may not be allowed the money from the said fund, if the ruleor the law otherwise does not permit. The beneficiary of the discretionary fundcannot feel any inconvenience or discomfort, in case the information is givenabout the amount, that has been givento him under the said rule. Of course, if any undue advantage has been derived,it cannot stand protected by simply hiding or by not disclosing the informationto the person, who asks for the same.
The plea that if such an information is given, it would cause unwarrantedinvasion of the privacy of the individual beneficiary is otherwise also notavailable to the petitioner or the Public Information Officer or the State norto the department concerned, as it may be the individual defence, if at allavailable, to the beneficiary. The information asked for, is only to provide theinformation with respect to the discretion of the Chief Minister’s Secretariat,where the funds have been released to the beneficiaries, and not the informationfrom the beneficiaries, as to what they have done to the funds given to them. Incase, any such information is asked for, which relates to third person, namely,the beneficiary, and if, he or she had claimed confidentiality of such aninformation, and if such an information can at all be treated as confidential,only in that case, provisions of Section 11 would apply, but it would also notmean that such aninformation would stand absolutely exempted from being disclosed.
It is to be noticed that when the beneficiary of the grant from the ChiefMinister’s Discretionary Fund is under an obligation to use the money so paidfor the same very purpose, for which, it has been paid with the obligation uponthe beneficiary to return the unused money in one go, and that too within theprescribed period, for which utilization certificate has to be furnished by theDistrict Magistrate after making necessary verification, it cannot be said thatit is an information, which can seek confidentiality within the meaning ofSection-11 of the Act of 2005 or can be treated as confidential by thebeneficiary, treating it to be a third party information. One cannot forget,that the monetary assistance extended to the beneficiary is from the publicfund.
In our considered opinion, the information asked for regarding the names anddetails of the persons, who have been paid an amount of more than Rs.1 lac fromthe Chief Minister’s Discretionary Fund for the period in question, is not aninformation, which is covered under Section 8(j) nor it stands exemptedotherwise. This takes us to the next question regarding the authority of theCommission/Chief Information Commission to direct the Public Information Officerto give the information asked for within a specified period, while dealing witha complaint under Section 18 of the Act.
The petitioner in support of his plea, that the Commission cannot direct forsupply of the information, in proceedings under Section 18, has relied upon thecase of *Reliance Industries Ltd. vs. Gujarat State Information Commission andOrs., reported in AIR 2007 GUJARAT 203. A learned Single Judge of the High Courtof Gujarat in this case, while considering the effect of information asked forrelating to third party, taking into account the provisions of Sections 11 and19 of the Act, also had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 18 of theAct, wherein the Court observed that a third party information cannot be givenunless the rules of natural justice are followed in the manner prescribed underthe Act.
The legal proposition as enunciated by the Gujarat High Court with respect toaffording of reasonable opportunity to the third party to whom either theinformation relates or who had supplied the information and which information isbeing treated as confidential by such a person, is not only the tenet of theprinciples of natural justice but it also flows from the statutory provisions ofSection 11 1) itself. In case where Section 11 applies, of course, dueopportunity, as provided under the Act, has to be afforded to the third partyand only after following its rules, the information can be supplied or refusedand that too by giving reasons.
We, therefore, are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid view of followingthe rules of natural justice, expressed by the Gujarat High Court.
The view expressed otherwise in respect of locus standi of a person to seek aninformation and also on the scope of Section 18 of the Act, requiresconsideration. The Gujarat High Court while dealing with the aforesaidproposition of law, took into consideration the judgement of the apex court inthe case of Ashok Kumar Pandey vs. State of West Bengal and others, reported inAIR 2004 SC 280, for holding that care has to be taken that the information isnot asked for by the persons, who seek the information with an intention toblackmail the person against whom the information is asked for and that thenature of the information asked for and the person who asked for information arethe relevant considerations.
In regard to the observations of the Gujarat High Court, suffice would be tomention that the Court proceeded on the assumption that the right to seekinformation is like filing writ petition in the nature of public interestlitigation. In a public Interest litigation, care has to be taken that it is nota petition for settling the personal score or satisfying the personal vendettaor is not a publicity interest litigation or pecuniary interest litigation. Theessence of the grievance raised and the bona fide of the person in bringing theissue to the Court, are such key factors, which play an important role in thepublic interest litigation.
The Supreme Court even in a petition of PIL has held in the case of T.N.Godavarman Thirumulpad (98) vs. Union of India and others, (2006) 5 SCC 28 andVishwanath Chaturvedi (3) vs. Union Of India and others, (2007) 4 SCC 380, thateven if the person bringing the cause to the Court has no locus standi to pursuethe matter or he is not a bona fide person or a public spirited person or mayhave approached the Court with political reasons but still in such a case thegrievance raised can be looked into and if found genuine and worth beingenquired into, the same can be entertained.
Under the Right to Information Act, the locus standi of the person is of noavail. Any citizen can ask for any information, which is not protected under therelevant clauses of exemption. The Public Information Officer is under the legalduty to supply the information so asked for. Sub-clause (2) of Section 6 itselfsays that an applicant making request for information shall not be required togive any reason for seeking the information or any other personal details exceptthose that may be necessary for contacting him. This leaves no room of doubtthat the information cannot be refused on the ground that the person asking forinformation is not a bona fide person and it cannot also be enquired from him asto why he is seeking the information.
The view, therefore, expressed by the Gujarat High Court in this regard withoutadverting to the scheme of the Act, 2005 and without noticing the provisions ofSection 2(j) and Section 3 of the Act, are contrary to law. Section 2(j), saysthat the right to information means the right to information accessible underthis Act, which is held by or under the control of any public authority andSection 3, says that subject to the provisions of this Act, all citizens shallhave the right to information.
We thus find that the Gujarat High Court did not take into consideration theprovisions of Section 2(j) and Section 3 and also sub-clause (2) of Section 6,which specifically prohibits from making any enquiry from the applicant forgiving reasons for seeking the information or any other personal details excepthis address, where he could be contacted. Thus, the view expressed by theGujarat High Court in respect of the locus standi of the applicant, asking forany information cannot be said to be a binding precedent.
We, therefore, with utmost regard to the learned Judge of the Gujarat HighCourt, are unable to subscribe to the said view. Gujarat High Court also heldthat the information cannot be directed to be given under Section 18, butrecourse can be taken in appeal for having the information, which has beeneither illegally withheld or has been specifically refused.
For finding out the true meaning, import and scope of Section 18, we have tomake purposive interpretation of the provision, keeping in view the object andpurpose of the Act. On seeing the scheme of the Act, the relevant extracts ofwhich, we have reproduced earlier, it is beyond doubt that the object andpurpose of the Act is to provide information to the citizen (applicant), whomakes a request for having such an information, which can be given under the Actand which does not stand exempted or so to say is not prohibited from beingfurnished under the provisions of the Act.
Normal rule of interpretation is, to give such meaning to the provisions of theAct, which furthers the object of the Act and does not restrict itsapplicability so as to defeat its very object and purpose. The intention inmaking a provision, the principle which guided for such an enactment and themischief which is intended to be rectified cannot be lost sight of, whilediscovering the true meaning and import of the provisions of the Act.
While interpreting any statute, normally a literal construction of the provisionhas to be made and if the language is clear, unambiguous and meaningful, whichforwards the cause of enactment, the Court would restrain itself from making aneffort to interpret the provisions in any different manner, which would have theeffect of amending the rule or rewriting the provision.. The literal rule ofconstruction is the normal rule of interpretation, which does not infringe uponthe statute or the statutory provision and carries forward the intention, objectand purpose of the Act. Any hardship to any person or any lacuna in the Act canalso not be filled in, unless of course the provision militates against theobject and purpose for which it has been enacted or leads to absurdity.
In the case of A.N. Roy, Commissioner of Police and another vs. Suresh ShamSingh, reported in (2006) 5 SCC 745, the Supreme Court observed as under: “*itis now well-settled principle of law that the court cannot enlarge the scope oflegislation or intention when the language of the statute is plain andunambiguous. Narrow and pedantic construction may not always be given effect to.The Courts should avoid a construction, which would reduce the legislation tofutility. It is also well settled that every statute is to be interpretedwithout any violence to its language. It is also trite that when an expressionis capable of more than one meaning, the court would attempt to resolve theambiguity in a manner consistent with the purpose of the provision, havingregard to the great consequences of the alternative constructions. “
In the case of Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. vs. ElectricityInspector and ETIO, (2007) 5 SCC 447, held that only in case a literalinterpretation gives rise to anomalous situation, purposive interpretation maybe resorted to, and again in the case of S.B. Bhattacharjee vs. S.D. Majumdar,(2007) 10 SCC 513, it was said that for giving effect to the legislative intentin the face of draftsman’s unskillfulness or ignorance of law, the court mustconsider executive instructions or office memorandum as executive interpretationbased on the doctrine of contemporanea expositio.
In the case of *Raghunath Rai Bareja vs. Punjab National Bank, (2007) 2 SCC 230,the Supreme Court held that the literal rule of interpretation really means thatthere should be no interpretation. In other words, we should read the statutesas it is, without distorting or twisting its language. The literal rule ofinterpretation is not only followed by judges and lawyers, but it is alsofollowed by the layman in his ordinary life. The meaning of the literal rule ofinterpretation is simply that we mean what we say and we say what we mean. Thefirst and foremost principle of interpretation of a statute in every system ofinterpretation is the literal rule of interpretation. The other rules ofinterpretation e.g. The mischief rule, purposive interpretation, etc. can onlybe resorted to when the plain words of a statute are ambiguous or lead to nointelligible results or if read literally would nullify the very object of thestatute. Where the words of astatute are absolutely clear and unambiguous, recourse cannot be had to theprinciples of interpretation other than the literal rule. Even if the literalinterpretation results in hardship or inconvenience, it has to be followed.
The Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the principle of purposiveinterpretation in the case of State of U.P. and others vs. Jeet S. Bisht andanother (2007) 6 SCC 586, wherein two Hon’ble Judges have delivered thejudgement separately, but the out come of the petition is the same, thoughreference to Larger Bench has been made, on the reasoning given by them.
In paragraphs 72 and 73, Justice S.B. Sinha, held as under: “72.With the adventof globalisation, we are witnessing a shift from formalism to a value-ladenapproach to law. In the contemporary scholarship, especially with the decimationof law as purely an autonomous discipline (with the emergence of cross-cuttingrealms such as Law and Economics, Law and Philosophy, Law and Society, IPR etal), we see that laws embody a goal, which may have its provenance in sciencesother than law as well. It is no more the black letter in the law which guidesthe interpretation but the goal which is embodied by the particular body of law,which may be termed as the rationality of law.
73. Law, in its value-laden conception, is not entirely endogenous in itsmeaning and purpose, the construction thereof also depends on the statement ofpurport and object. There is a spillover of the aforementioned shift inphilosophy of law to statutory interpretation. Purposive interpretation, oflately, has gained considerable currency, which is relevant for the sake ofmaximising the efficiency in respect to the point behind the rule. There may bea situation when purposive interpretation is required even in the context ofdeciphering the constitutional mandate by invoking the notion of active libertydiscovered by Justice Stephen Breyer of the American Supreme Court. This is theprecise role which was exhorted by Bruce A. Ackerman in the famous StorrsLecture.”
Despite reference to Larger Bench, the rule of purposive interpretation, canstill be made applicable to understand the provisions in the instant case..
Section 18 of the Act is a provision, which allows the applicant who has beenrefused information or who believes that complete information has not beengiven, or who has been denied the information by simply delaying theinformation, to make a complaint to the Commission, Central or State, as thecase may be, who would make an enquiry into the said complaint.
Section 19(8)(a) is in general terms, which confers power upon the Commission,may be the Central or the State, to require the public authority to take anystep as may be, necessary to secure compliance under the said Act includingproviding access in a particular form to the information asked for. This meansthat the Commission can direct for supplying the necessary information in suchform, as may be required, therefore, there cannot be any dispute that in theappeal proceedings, the information which has not been given by the PublicInformation Officer can be directed to be supplied.
What would be the position, in case a complaint has been made under Section 18of the Act, regarding refusal of information etc. is a matter which requiresconsideration.
Section 18 is a provision which gives a statutory avenue for vindicating thegrievance of the persons, who asked for such information, but the same has notbeen given. To keep a check and control upon the functioning of the PublicInformation Officers, so that they may not go berserk and violate the statute,capriciously and arbitrarily, Section 18 has been enacted. In case theCommission finds that the concerned officer has violated the provisions of theAct, in discharging the duties under the Act and has illegally, wrongfully ormalafidely refused the information, he can be subjected to a penalty, which maybe, namely, Rs.250/- per day, till the information is provided or to a maximumof Rs.25000/-.
In case the intention of the provision of the aforesaid Act was only to punishthe guilty information officer, there would have been no occasion under Section18(3) to confer powers upon the Commission, which are vested in a civil courtwhile trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908),requiring discovery and inspection of documents and requisitioning any publicrecord or copies thereof from any court or office, and for specificallyproviding under sub-clause (4) of Section 18 that notwithstanding anythinginconsistent contained in any other Act of Parliament or State Legislature, asthe case may be, the Central Information Commission or the State InformationCommission, as the case may be, may, during the inquiry of any complaint underthis Act, examine any record to which this Act applies which is under thecontrol of the public authority, and no such record may be withheld from it onany grounds.
The obvious intention and the purpose of the aforesaid powers being vested withthe Commission in the matter of enquiry is to confer all such powers upon theCommission, which can compel the erring officers to disclose and supply theinformation, which cannot be withheld for any reason whatsoever under theprovisions of the Act. Of course, an enquiry on such a complaint naturally wouldmean to enquire as to whether the information was rightly refused, delayed orwas incorrectly given, and for that matter, the power, as given in sub-clauses(3) and (4) of Section 18 the Act, have to be used and on finding that theinformation was wrongly refused or illegally withheld or was incorrectly ormalafidely refused, the Commission cannot be stopped from issuing direction forgiving the necessary information.
The purpose of holding enquiry would be of no meaning if only punishment isgiven to the erring officer, as it would not serve the purpose of the Act andthe power so conferred upon the Commission, requiring requisitioning of anypublic record or copies thereof from any court or office, shall also have only alimited purpose to find out as to whether the punishment should be awarded tothe erring officer or not. This is not the intention of the Act or theprovisions of Section 18.
Section 20 which prescribes the penalties, takes into account both ‘complaint’and ‘appeal’, says that the Central Information Commission or the StateInformation Commission, as the case may be, while deciding any complaint orappeal, if satisfied that the application has wrongly been refused from beingentertained or the information has not been given for the reasons given therein,impose the penalty as prescribed, meaning thereby that at the time of eitherdeciding a complaint or an appeal, the Commission has the power to imposepenalty and that this penalty would be imposed till the application is receivedor information is furnished. This clarifies that the penalty can be imposed bythe Commission while deciding the complaint or while deciding the appeal. Suchpenalty can be imposed for such term, till the application is received orinformation sought for is given, as the case may be, @ Rs.250/- each day,subject to a maximum of Rs.25,000/-.
So far the power to issue direction for receiving the application or forsupplying the information is concerned, it is for one and the same purpose,i..e., for supplying the correct information to the applicant, if it does notstand exempted under the Act. In this regard, there can be no distinction, whenthe Commission enquires into a complaint or hears an appeal under the aforesaidpower. This view also stands fortified by the fact, that Section 20, which givesthe consequence of enquiry being held under Section 18, on a complaint beingreceived, says in sub-clause (1) “…… It shall impose a penalty of Rs.250/-per day, till the information is provided or to a maximum of Rs.25000/-”,meaning thereby that the penalty is to be imposed for compliance of theprovisions of the Act.
The aforesaid clause in inverted commas, means beyond doubt that the Commissionon being satisfied about the complaint and while deciding any complaint orappeal, if it is of the opinion that without any reasonable cause, theapplication was refused, or the necessary information has not been given or thesame has not been furnished within time or has been malafidely denied or theknowingly incorrect information has been given etc. etc., only then it shallimpose the penalty aforesaid. Since the penalty of Rs.250/- per day is to beimposed till the application is received by the Public Information Officer,Central or State, as the case may be, if they had refused to accept applicationor the information asked for is furnished, it is apparent, that the very purposeof this penal provision is to make the officer concerned to supply theinformation.
In a given case, where a complaint has been made that the information has notbeen furnished, the penalty of Rs. 250/- each day, shall be imposed till theinformation is furnished, to a maximum of Rs.25000/-, which means that evenwhile dealing with the complaints, the Commission can ask for the disclosure ofthe information, otherwise, the provision would not have contained the phraseaforesaid, which prescribes the penalty of Rs. 250/- each day, till applicationis received or information is furnished, as the case may be.
The intention of the provision is clear. The penalty is to be imposed for theperiod during which either the application is not received or the information isnot given, but the moment, the application is accepted or information is given,as the case may be, the penalty cannot be imposed any further.. Of course, themaximum limit of penalty is Rs.25000/-, but that does not in any way fetter thepower of the Commission to issue a direction for furnishing the information. Themaximum amount of penalty does not qualify the main substantive provision, whichsays that it shall be imposable till the information is given or the applicationis received, as the case may be.
In a given case where no appeal has been filed or even after first appeal, theinformation has not been given and if no second appeal has been filed, but acomplaint has been made, it would be the discretion of the Commission to passappropriate orders for furnishing of the information, in case the Commission issatisfied and if it is established from the record that the information wasillegally refused or not given correctly etc. etc.
In the absence of any prohibition under Section 18 and there being no otherprovision, which puts any embargo or curtails the jurisdiction of the Commissionto order for supply of the information not duly supplied, or to ask forreceiving of the application, which has been wrongly refused from beingentertained, the provisions of Section 18 has to be read in a manner, which doesnot have the effect of curtailing the jurisdiction of the Commission, whichotherwise can be exercised under the provisions of the Act.
Section 18 is a substantive provision regarding lodging and enquiring into acomplaint, whereas Section 20 is the consequence of such an enquiry. The wholepurpose of making an enquiry on a complaint being given by the affected person,shall stand defeated, if the two provisions are read in isolation or they aregiven a meaning which does not further the object of the Act. From a harmoniousconstruction of the aforesaid provisions keeping in mind the purpose for whichthey have been enacted, it can be safely concluded that the powers of theCommission under Section 18 are not restricted only to make enquiry and awardpunishment, but they also extend for issuing direction for receiving theapplication or for giving the necessary information under the provisions of theAct. Any other interpretation would not be in consonance with the scheme of theAct and shall also amount to restricting and curtailing the power of theCommission by judicialinterpretation.
The Act contains two types of information; first which is to be suo motuprovided without even being asked for under Section 4 and the other information,which is to be given when asked for. Of course, there is a third classification,which exempts certain information from being disclosed and a corollary to thesaid exemption is such information, which though stands protected, but can bedisclosed by the competent authority, if satisfied that it is in larger publicinterest to disclose such information. Any interpretation to any of theprovisions of the Act, if leads to absurdity or may lead to defeat the verypurpose of the Act, has to be avoided. There is no attempt to twist the words orthe phraseology used, but for correct interpretation of provision of Section 18,it cannot be read in isolation, but has to be seen in the light of theconsequences of a complaint of Section 18, as given in Section 20 of the Act,besides also the purpose and object ofthe Act for which it has been enacted.
It shall be a futile exercise in case the enquiry as contemplated, on acomplaint is made, but remains confined only to the award of punishment with noconsequence of furthering the object of the Act, i.e. without requiring thePublic Information Officer to supply the information asked for. The meaning,intention and import, therefore, is clear that if a complaint is made and if theCommission is satisfied that the information has wrongly been withheld or hasbeen refused, etc., then in addition to the penal actions prescribed it can alsoorder for supply of such an information.
We, therefore, with deep respect are unable to concur with the view expressed bythe Gujarat High Court to the contrary in the case of Reliance Industries Ltd.vs. Gujarat State Information Commission and Ors., reported in AIR 2007 GUJARAT203, with respect to the scope of Section 18.
In view of above, we are of the considered opinion that neither the informationasked for regarding distribution of the discretionary fund viz. in the instantcase, information regarding the details of the persons, who have been given anamount of more than Rs.1 lac can be refused nor it stands exempted under Section8(j) of the Act. We are also of the view that the Commission while enquiringinto the complaint under Section 18, can issue necessary directions forsupply/disclosure of the information asked for, in case the Commission issatisfied that the information has been wrongly withheld or has not beencompletely given or incorrect information has been given etc.., whichinformation otherwise is liable to be supplied under the provisions of the Act.
Before parting, we will also like to put on record that all the informationregarding the Chief Minister’s Discretionary Fund, including the informationregarding the persons, who have been granted any amount from the discretionaryfund with their category and the amount paid/disbursed, may be treated such aninformation, which requires to be made available to the public in terms ofSection 4 of the Act. The public has a right to know about the disbursement ofthe Chief Minister’s Discretionary Fund to the persons and the amount which hasbeen paid with a further information that whether the amount has been properlyutilized in the given time or not.
We, however, refrain ourselves from issuing any such directive, but we hope andtrust that the State Government shall look into the matter and exercise itsdiscretion, particularly when there are specific rules, duly formulated by theGovernor, prescribing for audit by the Accountant General, U.P. of thediscretionary fund and also other provisions regarding the entitlement andutilization etc., which we have already discussed above.
We have been persuaded to make these observations in accordance with theprovisions of the Rules of 1999, sub-clause (xvii) of Section 4(1)(b) and alsosub-clause (2) of Section 4 of the Right to Information Act, 2005, which saysthat it shall be a constant endeavour of every public authority to take steps inaccordance with the requirements of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 4,to provide as much information suo motu to the public at regular intervalsthrough various means of communications, including internet, so that the publichave minimum resort to the use of this Act to obtain information. We, thus donot find any illegality in the impugned orders dated 12.12.2007, 18.1.2008 and15.2.2008, contained in Annexure Nos.1, 2 and 3 respectively to the writpetition, passed by the Commission nor we find any reason for the petitioner notto supply the information asked for.
The writ petition is devoid of merits and is dismissed.July 1st, 2008
Published September 29, 2008 RTI Act
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About Me
- Kamal Kumar Pandey (Adv. Supreme Court of India)
- Lawyer Practising at Supreme Court of India. Court Experience: Criminal, Civil & PIL (related to Property, Tax, Custom & Duties, MVAC, insurance, I.P.R., Copyrights & Trademarks, Partnerships, Labour Disputes, etc.) Socio-Legal: Child Rights, Mid Day Meal Programme, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyaan, Women Rights, Against Female Foeticide, P.R.Is, Bonded Labour, Child labour, Child marriage, Domestic violence, Legal Literacy, HIV/AIDS, etc. Worked for Legal Aid/Advise/Awareness/Training/Empowerment/Interventions/Training & Sensitisation.
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